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1. Introduction
The demand for insurance is traditionally explained by the assumptions that insured are
risk-averse, whereas insurers are risk-neutral1. Risk-neutral customers, however, would
not be interested in insuring at a premium that exceeds the expected loss, i.e. the
actuarial fair rate. To introduce a numerical example, under the risk-allocation point of
view, an insurance that covers an expected loss of 300 and charges a premium of 400
would never be acceptable to a risk-neutral agent.
However, there are some limitations to the explanatory power of the risk-allocation ap-
proach. E.g., ﬁrms are quite an important group of customers. Ashby/Diacon (1999)
point out that ﬁrms have a linear rather than a concave yield function and therefore can-
not be judged as risk-averse2. Goldberg (1990) furthermore argues against the careless
usage of the ad-hoc assumption of risk-aversion in institutional economics, because it
keeps the focus away from other useful insights which might be better able to explain
ﬁrms’ behavior, such as speciﬁc investments.
There is a growing literature that analyzes why risk-neutral agents, in particular ﬁrms,
might be interested in buying insurance even at a premium above the fair rate, or invest
in risk-management. Insurance does not only cover risks, but also provides other services,
such as evaluation of risky situations or the professional handling of settlements3. With
respect to risk-neutral insurance customers, a new branch of literature seems to establish.
1See e.g. Arrow (1971) and Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) or one of the enormous number of text-
books on this topic, see e.g. Williams/Smith/Young (1998, 36f.).
2The authors show that a risk-neutral ﬁrm with market power may have an incentive to reduce
technological risk, i.e. the variance of its uncertain output.
3See Mayerss/Smith (1982); see also Skogh (1998), who points out that risk-averison is only one
out of many reasons for insurance.
2In this paper, I introduce another reason why risk-neutral agents can beneﬁt from ins-
urance. I analyze legal cost insurance as an example for a strategic device that inﬂuences
the interaction of the insured with other agents4. This strategic aspect has not been fo-
cussed on yet, hence the paper adds a new contribution to this new branch of insurance
literature.
Under the strategic approach, it is not the aspect of risk- allocation that makes legal cost
insurance beneﬁcial for potential litigants, but the possibility to improve their strategic
position in a law suit. Legal cost insurance has two strategic eﬀects in a game with
settlement and trial. First of all, legal cost insurance can make the plaintiﬀ’s threat to
sue credible even if the case has a negative expected value5. The second strategic eﬀect of
legal cost insurance is to shift the bargaining range and therefore the settlement result.
This eﬀect can make legal cost insurance attractive for both of the litigants even in a
positive expected value suit.
Extending the numeric example introduced above might be helpful to explain why taking
account of strategic eﬀects may lead to a diﬀerent result: Assume that litigation costs
are 1000, of which the the insured had to bear a deductible of 700 in case of trial. Thus,
as in the example above, the insurance covers 300. Let the insurance premium again be
400. If the strategic eﬀect of legal cost insurance leads to a settlement of 500 (whereas
without legal cost insurance, the settlement result would be zero), then it is beneﬁcial
for a plaintiﬀ to insure even when he is risk-neutral.
Without legal cost insurance in negative expected value cases, the threat to sue would be
noncredible, and the potential defendant would not agree to make a positive settlement
payment. If, on the other hand, the potential plaintiﬀ is insured, the insurance premium
is sunk when the settlement negotiations take place. The idea to turn a negative expected
value case into a positive expected value case by distributing the litigation costs over
time is due to Bebchuk (1996). However, he analyzes retainer fees rather than legal
cost insurance6. Retainers diﬀer from legal cost insurance in two aspects:
 Under the British legal cost allocation rule, a prevailing plaintiﬀ would receive
reimbursement for retainer fees, but not for the insurance rate he has paid. Thus,
the retainer is not entirely sunk, whereas the insurance premium is sunk.
 Under both the British and the American rule, the retainer and the residual fee
add up to the total litigation costs, whereas the sum of insurance premium and
deductible do not necessarily add up to the litigation costs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, the equi-
4Legal cost insurance and risk-averse plaintiﬀs are analyzed in Rickman/Heyes (1998).
5Note that negative expected value suits are not necessarily meritless, see Bebchuk (1998). A legi-
timate suit can have a negative expeceted value even if the probability to prevail in court is high,
due to excessively high litigation costs.
6See also Bebchuk/Guzman (1996) and Croson/Mnookin (1996). The latter point out that non-
refundable retainers may have a strategic impact similar to the one described here, but admit that
the assumption of non- refundability might be problematic.
3librium solution for positive and negative expected value suits is derived. Section 4
presents the main results and discusses brieﬂy the impact of some modiﬁcations of the
assumptions I made.
2. The model
Consider two risk-neutral players, P and D, that engage in a dangerous activity. For
example, P is a pedestrian, D a driver; the latter might cause an accident that harms
the former. The interaction takes place in three stages:
 The insurance stage: P and D simultaneously decide whether to buy a legal
cost insurance or not.
 The accident stage: An accident might occur at probability , which causes
harm to P, who values not having to suﬀer this harm with X.
 The litigation stage If an accident has occured, the parties negotiate on a sett-
lement. If they reach an agreement, the game ends with a payment S from D to
P. If the parties do not reach an agreement, P has to decide whether to proceed
to trial or not. In case of trial, the judge decides with probability  in favor of P.
Figure 1 represents these three stages graphically. The tree starts at the bottom with
the decision of the parties whether to insure or not. Since this decision takes place
simultaneously, the two decision nodes of D are within one information set, which is
indicated by a dashed line between these two nodes.
The insurance stage leads to four possible combinations of decisions. f > 0 is the ins-
urance premium (and assumed to be positive, since the insurance company needs to
cover at least the marginal costs of contracting). e = f denotes the decision of P to
insure and g = f represents the decision of D to buy insurance. e = 0 and g = 0 stand
for the decision of P or D, respectively, not to purchase insurance. To simplify ﬁgure 1,
three of the subgames that arise out of the insurance stage have been eliminated, as it
is indicated by the dashed box. Thus, ﬁgure 1 shows the accident and litigation stages
only for one of these four branches, namely the combination e = f and g = 0 (where
only P is insured)7.
The accident stage is represented by the box labelled with ”A”. In one case no accident
occurs with probability 1  ;0 <  < 1 and the game ends8. Due to the assumed
risk-neutrality, P is not interested in buying a risk-insurance to cover the accident loss
(at least not at a fair rate).
7Of course, the three omitted subgames will be taken into consideration in the equilibrium analysis
below.
8The possibility of opportunistic suits is thus excluded. See Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997) for an
analysis of opportunistic suits and judicial detection skill.
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Alternatively, in the case of an accident (with probability ), the parties enter the
litigation stage. The parties have no means to inﬂuence . This assumption excludes
any precautionary eﬀect on the insurance decision.
First, the parties negotiate on a settlement. These negotiations are represented by the
box labelled with the word ”settlement”. If the bargaining range, denoted as R, is non-
empty, the parties reach a settlement, and the game ends with a payment S 2 R from
D to P. To keep matters as simple as possible and to focus on the strategic impact
of insurance, I assume settlement under perfect and complete information and neglect
problems like asymmetric information or divergent expectations9. If, and only if, the
bargaining range is empty, P has to decide whether to proceed to trial or not.
In case of trial, the plaintiﬀ P faces litigation costs that are denoted as c(e), where
e 2 f0;fg. If P is uninsured (e = 0), he has to pay the full costs c(0). If he is insured
9See Bebchuk (1984) and Priest/Klein (1985). In Kirstein (1999), I analyze legal cost insurance
when the parties expectations to prevail at court diverge.
5(e = f), he only has to bear a deductible c(f) which is non-negative: c(0) > c(f)  0.
The trial costs of the defendant D are respectively denoted as c(g) with c(0) being the
full costs and c(f) the deductible10.
P prevails in trial with probability , 0 <  < 1, which is assumed to be independent of
the insurance decisions of the parties. Hence, the expected payoﬀ of P from proceeding
to trial is X minus the trial costs c(e) minus the insurance premium e he has paid
in advance. D’s expected payoﬀ in case of a trial is X  c(g)  g (recall that in the
example subgame presented in ﬁgure 1, g is zero). If P does not proceed to trial, the
parties only have to bear their insurance premiums, if they have bought an insurance
during the ﬁrst stage.
I assume that the insurance premium covers one period and that  is the probability of
an accident during this period. Furthermore, I assume that the parties have the same
expectations concerning the probabilities  and .
3. Equlibrium analysis
In this section, the game of ﬁgure 1 is solved by backward induction. I ﬁrst analyze
the litigation stage, which consists of settlement negotiations and, if settlement fails, the
decision of the plaintiﬀ whether to proceed to trial or not. As the solution concept for
the settlement negotiation, I use the Nash bargaining solution, assuming zero bargaining
costs and equal bargaining power.
The solution of the litigation stage depends on two factors: First, the parties’ decisions
during the insurance stage, and second, whether the case has a negative or a positive
expected value. Using the results of the litigation stage, I present the insurance stage
as a reduced game form and derive parameter ranges for the diﬀerent possible Nash
equilibria for both the negative and the positive expected value case.
3.1 The litigation stage
If settlement negotiations fail, P will proceed to trial if, and only if, the expected payoﬀ
of the trial is positive. This payoﬀ comprises the expected judgement X minus the trial
costs of P, c(e). Hence, P will try the case if, and only if, c(e) < X. The expected net
value of the decision of P to proceed to trial is X c(e) for P and [X +c(g)] for D.
If P does not proceed to trial, the value of this decision is zero for both of the parties.
P will proceed to trial if, and only if, the value of this decision exceeds the value of the
decision not to proceed, hence if X  c(e) > 0. In this case, his threat to try the case
is credible. If, however, D expects that P will not proceed to trial, then this threat is
called non-credible. Now deﬁne
10Litigation costs are allocated according to the American rule: Each party has to bear its own trial
costs.
6 X > c(0) as positive expected value case,
 X < c(0) as negative expected value case, and
 c(f) < X as the Credibility Condition.
This allows to derive the ﬁrst result of this paper:
Proposition 1: If, in negative expected value cases, P is not insured, then
his trial threat is non-credible. If the legal cost insurance fulﬁlls the Credibility
Condition, then it makes his trial threat credible. In positive expected value
cases, the threat to sue is credible even without legal cost insurance.
The Nash bargaining solution requires to derive the settlement range, denoted as R.
This is determined by the trial decision of P. He will only accept settlement payments
S that exceed the value of his decision, namely11:
S 

0 : X < c(e)
X  c(e) : X > c(e)
If P credibly threats to proceed to trial, he will only accept settlement payments that
exceed the (positive) net expected value of the trial12. If, on the other hand, his threat to
proceed is non-credible he would accept any positive settlement payment. D anticipates
the trial decision of P and will only accept to make settlement payments that hold
S 

0 : X < c(e)
X  c(g) : X > c(e)
Hence, if D expects that P proceeds to trial, he would agree to make any settlement
payment that is smaller than his expected loss from trial, S < X + c(g). If, on the
other hand, he expects P not to proceed, D will not agree to make a positive settle-
ment payment. From these considerations, the settlement range (which is limited by the
parties’ threat points) can be derived:
R =

[X  c(e);X + c(g)] : X > c(e)
; : X < c(e)
If X > c(e) holds, the parties reach a settlement with S 2 [X  c(e);X + c(g)]. If,
on the other hand, X < c(e) holds, neither a settlement nor a trial will take place. The
latter case is equivalent to a settlement with a zero payment: none of the parties receives
or pays anything, and the game ends. Hence, this case will be treated as if S = 0.
11Note that this expression is conditioned on c(e), with e 2 f0;fg, whereas the deﬁnition of the negative
and the positive expected value cases is contingent on c(0). For simpliﬁcation, I do not discuss cases
of indiﬀerence.
12For simplicity, I assume that a settlement oﬀer is also acceptable if it equals the threat point.
7Obviously, the credibility of the threat to sue determines whether or not the parties agree
upon a positive settlement payment13. From Proposition 1 it follows that, in negative
expected value cases, legal cost insurance that obeys the Credibility Condition motivates
D to make a positive settlement oﬀer. The insurance decreases the costs a plaintiﬀ has
to bear in case of trial, whereas the insurance premium is sunk when the plaintiﬀ has to
make his trial decision. Hence it is only the deductible that is relevant when P has to
make this decision with regard to the trial.
Under the assumption of equal bargaining power and zero bargaining costs, the Nash
bargaining solution leads to the arithmetic mean of the parties’ threat points as settle-
ment payments. A legal cost insurance contract consists of the insurance premium and
the deductible or the amount that is covered, hence each possible legal cost insurance
contract can be described by the parameters [f;c(f)].





The share of a party’s litigation costs that is coverd by the legal cost insurance then is 2h.
Taking into account the eﬀect of negative expected value suits and assuming that legal
cost insurance obeys the Credibility Condition, the possible settlement results, denoted
as as S(e;g) with e;g 2 f0;fg, are:
 S(f;f) = X + c(f)  c(f)
2 = X
 S(f;0) = X + c(0)  c(f)
2 = X + h
 S(0;f) =
(
0 : X < c(0)
X + c(f)  c(0)
2 = X  h : X > c(0)
 S(0;0) =
(
0 : X < c(0)
X + c(0)  c(0)
2 = X : X > c(0)
Due to h > 0, in positive expected value cases S(f;0) > S(f;f) = S(0;0) > S(0;f)
holds: the settlement result is X if neither or if both of the parties is insured. If only
the plaintiﬀ is insured, this would increase the settlement result, whereas it is smaller if
only the defendant is insured.
In negative expected value cases S(f;0) > S(f;f) > S(0;0) = S(0;f) holds: if the
defendant is not insured, the settlement result will be zero. Being the only one who is
insured leads to the highest settlement result for the plaintiﬀ. If both parties are insured,
the settlement result is X, just as in a positive expected value case.
13See Nalebuff (1988, 198).
8Hence, the positive and the negative expected value cases lead to diﬀerent outcomes if
the plaintiﬀ is not insured. This diﬀerence has an impact on the analysis of the insurance
stage in the subsequent section.
3.2 The insurance stage
3.2.1 The decision situation
In the insurance stage the parties decide on the values of e and g. The payoﬀs of the
subgames that follow this stage depend on these decisions: P expects to receive X  e
if no accident occurs (with probability 1  ), and S(e;g)  e in case an accident has
occured (with probability ). His optimal insurance decision is
e
 = argmax S(e;g
) + (1  )X  e
with e 2 f0;fg. D expects g if no accident occurs and V g in case of accident. His
optimal decision is
g
 = argmin S(e
;g) + (1  )g
with g 2 f0;fg. The following two sections show the insurance stage as a 2x2 game,
where the payoﬀs are the subgame values of the litigation stage S(e;g) as derived in the
previous section.
3.2.2 Positive expected value cases
First consider the positive expected value case. Table 1 shows the insurance stage as a
2x2 game. The strategies of P (e = 0 means not to insure, e = f denotes the decision
for insurance) are presented on the left column of table 1, whereas the strategies of D
(g = 0 for no insurance, g = f for insurance) can be found in the ﬁrst row.
The equilibrium analysis of this game leads to the following result:
Proposition 2: In a positive expected value case, the strategy combination
(e = f;g = f) is a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies if, and only if,
f < h and the Credibility Condition holds.
If the legal cost insurance premium (which is exogenously given) is too low, the parties
are in a prisoners’ dilemma situation: It is individually rational to insure, because this
improves the bargaining result, but if both parties are insured, the settlement payment
is just the same as between uninsured parties14.
14N.B. that this result is not entirely driven by the assumption that the parties face equal litigation
costs and insurance premiums. The prisoners’ dilemma result also holds if diﬀerent litigation costs
and insurance premiums are assumed.
9Table 1: Insurance stage, positive expected value case
D g = 0 g = f
P
X (X  h)  f
e = 0
(1  )X + X (1  )X + (X  h)
(X + h) X  f
e = f
(1  )X + (X + h)  f (1  )X + X  f
Since the game only concerns the payoﬀ to P and D (whereas the insurer is not taken into
account), this Nash equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient. If, on the other hand, the legal cost
insurance premium is suﬃciently high, namely f > h, then the strategy combination
(e = 0;g = 0) is the Nash equilibrium, which is Pareto-eﬃcient.
3.2.3 Negative expected value cases
The insurance stage in the negative expected value case is represented in table 2.
Table 2: Insurance stage, negative expected value case




(1  )X (1  )X
(X + h) X  f
e = f
(1  )X + (X + h)  f (1  )X + X  f
This game can have three diﬀerent Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as the next pro-
position claims:
10Proposition 3: In negative expected value cases, the following strategy proﬁ-
les are unique Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the insurance stage game,
if the Credibility Condition holds15:
 No party insures: (e = 0;g = 0) if, and only if, f > (X + h)
 Only P insures: (e = f;g = 0) if, and only if, (X + h) > f > h
 Both parties insure: (e = f;g = f) if, and only if, f < minfh;Xg
The strategy combination (e = 0;g = f) - only D insures - will never be a
Nash equilibrium, since f > 0. The game does not have a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies if, and only if, h > f > X.
Figure 2 shows the possible constellations of the parameters f (the insurance premium)
and c(f) (the deductible), and the resulting equlibria (e;g). The lower diagonal line in
ﬁgure 2 represents f = h; above this line, the condition f > h is fulﬁlled. The upper
diagonal line stands for f = (X+h), the horizontal dashed line represents f = X.16
To the left hand side of the vertical line, the Credibility Condition is fulﬁlled.
Legal cost insurance contracts with [f;c(f)] combination between the diagonal lines
in ﬁgure 2 and left of the vertical line would implement the strategy combination
(e = f;g = 0) as the Nash equilibrium. [f;c(f)] combinations above the upper diagonal
line and on the right hand side of the vertical line would implement (e = 0;g = 0). If
the legal cost insurance contracts consist of parameter constellation above the horizontal
line, but below the lower diagonal line, then the insurance stage game would have no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (indicated as ”no NE”). Below the horizontal and
to the left of the vertical line, (e = f;g = f) would be implemented.
15Proof of Proposition 3:
 If f > (X + h), then e = 0 is the dominant strategy for P; g = 0 is always the best
answer of D on this. Hence, regardless of D’s best answer on e = f, the Nash equilibrium is
(e = 0;g = 0), q.e.d.
 If f > h, then g = 0 is the dominant strategy of D; with (X +h) > f, the best answer of P
is e = f. Hence, regardless of P’s best answer on g = f, the Nash equilibrium is (e = f;g = 0),
q.e.d.
 If f < minfh;Xg, which implies f < (X +h), the strategy e = f is dominant for P and
the best answer of D would be g = f. Hence, regardless of D’s best answer on e = 0, the Nash
equilibrium is (e = f;g = f), q.e.d.
Note that the insurance game would have multiple Nash equilibria, if the above conditions did not
hold strictly. E.g., with f = (X + h), the game has two Nash equilibria, namely e = 0;g = 0 and
e = f;g = 0.
16As presented here, ﬁgure 2 represents the case of extraordinary high trial costs, namely c(0) > 3X.
If this condition does not hold, then the dashed horizontal line would be above the intersection of
the lower diagonal with the vertical line.


















































X c(0) 2X + c(0) c(f)
4. Results and discussion
The previous section presented the positive analysis of the insurance and settlement
game. In equilibrium, the insurer would never actually have to pay litigation costs, since
the parties either settle or do not proceed to trial. Thus, the actuarial fair rate is zero.
However, as shown above, there are equilibria in which the players are motivated to buy
insurance at a positive rate, despite the fact that they are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In negative expected value suits, the threat to sue is non-credible and thus the defendant
is not motivated to make a positive settlement oﬀer. In this case, a legal cost insurance
that holds the Credibility Condition provides a credible threat for the plaintiﬀ and
thereby induces a settlement. Even in positive expected value suits, the parameters can
be such that legal cost insurance is attractive for one or the other party in order to
improve their settlement position.
But the analysis does not provide an answer to the normative question which of the
possible equilibria should be implemented. If the legal system aims to protect the legiti-
mate claim of P and simultaneously wants to discourage D from buying insurance only
for redistributive purposes, then the Nash equilibrium (e = f;g = 0) in the insurance
stage can be realized by setting the insurance premium f such that
12(X + h) > f > h
with h = [c(0)  c(f)]=2. Hence, under the assumptions made, it is possible to regu-
late legal cost insurance such that legimate claims lead to positive settlements, but a
suboptimal Nash equilibrium in positive expected value cases can be avoided, as well as
insurance only for redistributive purposes.
To relax some of the assumptions of the model might lead to diﬀerent results. E.g.,
Bebchuk (1984) and (1988) analyzes settlement under imcomplete information - in
these models the plaintiﬀ can hope for a positive settlement even in negative expected
value cases17. It is assumed that legal cost insurance covers the litigation costs minus
the deductible. This implicitly assumes that no renegotiation between the plaintiﬀ and
the insurance company takes place before (or during) trial. To allow for renegotiations
would of course alter the strategic eﬀect of legal cost insurance18.
On the other hand, it is not crucial which cost allocation rule is valid. To replace the
American by the British rule would lead to conditions for Nash Equilibria that allow to
derive qualitatively the same results. The same holds for the introduction of diﬀerent
kinds of litigation costs, deductibles, or insurance premiums.
In the model, the insurance contract parameters (premium and deductible) are treated
as exogenous and are subject to a comparative static analysis. It would be an interesting
next step to treat the insurance company as a player that chooses these parameters in
order to maximize its proﬁts, subject to the constraints provided by the equilibrium
analysis presented here.
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